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WIRETAPPING AND THE SUPREME COURT
GARRY R. BULLARb
The immeasureable benefit which society de-
rives from the telephone is obvious to all. Equally
apparent is the fact that the telephone's use is by
no means limited to socially desirable endeavor.
It serves without discrimination the housewife,
businessman, kidnapper, doctor, lawyer, pimp,
and narcotics pusher.i This situation, coupled with
the relative ease with which a telephone communi-
cation can be secretly intercepted, has resulted in
a basic conflict of interest in the field of law en-
forcement: the interest of the individual in the
protection of his personal privacy; and the some-
times conflicting interest of society in the detec-
tion, prevention, and prosecution of crime.
The development of the common law obviously
did not include rules governing electronic com-
munications of any form. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of legislative enactments, communications
by telephone or telegraph could be intercepted
with impunity, interception being limited practi-
cally only by the means available. When legislative
action did come it pertained only to the protection
of the communication equipment. It did not ex-
tend to the interception of the communication.
Thus, the early state statutes had no real effect
I See Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32
CORNELL L.Q. 514 (1947).
upon the use of wiretapping inasmuch as the com-
mon law rule admitted evidence regardless of its
source. Evidence obtained from a wiretap was
therefore admissible even under a state statute
prohibiting tampering with a telephone or tele-
graph wire.2 If such evidence were to be excluded,
action must be forthcoming in one of two possible
ways: either express legislative prohibition of the
practice of wiretapping,3 implemented by judicial
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
statute,4 or express legislative exclusion of wiretap
evidence itself. An early attempt was made, how-
2 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2183 (3d ed. 1940). Wire-
tap evidence would be treated as any other evidence
obtained in violation of the law; in this case, state
malicious mischief statutes prohibiting tampering with
the wires.
3 This was the case in 1918, when the government
seized the communications network and prohibited all
wiretapping during seizure. 40 STAT. 1017, 42 U.S.C.
§18 (1918). This statute lapsed when the government
returned the systems to private enterprise. However, a
later appropriation bill prohibited all wiretapping in
the enforcement of prohibition. Department of Justice
Appropriation Act of March 1, 1933, 47 STAT. 1381.
4 This was the case in the rule announced by the
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914), which excluded all evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment, as a means of
discouraging violation of the amendment by unlawful
search or seizure.
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ever, to attack the use of wiretap evidence from
yet a different direction. This attempt involved
the bringing of wiretapping within the fourth
amendment prohibition of unreasonable search
or seizure.' This attempt failed when a closely
divided court held in Olmstead v. United States,6
that wiretapping, inasmuch as it did not involve
the element of trespass, was not violative of the
fourth amendment.7 This decision was accom-
panied by vigorous dissents by both Justice Holmes
and Justice Brandeis, who deplored the general
practice of wiretapping.8 The spirit, at least, of
their opinions was to re-appear, however, in subse-
quent majority decisions.9
The effect of the Olmstead case was that between
1928, the date of that decision, and 1937, the date
of the next Supreme Court ruling on the subject,
wiretapping was admissible in federal courts in the
absence of a statute construed to prohibit the prac-
tice of wiretapping itself or the use of evidence so
procured." An attempt was made shortly after
the Olmstead case to provide such legislation, but
it failed." During this period, however, a statute
was passed which was to become of paramount
importance later on. The act received none of the
debate or fanfare due an issue as controversial as
wiretapping. It was the Federal Communications
' U. S. CONST. Amend. IV.
6 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 The 5-4 majority narrowly construed the fourth
amendment so as to exclude mere sight or hearing
beyond the confines of one's home from the scope of an
"unreasonable search or seizure" under the amend-
ment.8 Brandeis and Holmes differed only as to the ap-
proach taken to express their mutual opposition to the
practice. Brandeis approached the practice from the
direction of an invasion of personal liberty. He con-
sidered wiretapping a far greater invasion of privacy
than tampering with the mail, because, among other
evils, it meant an invasion as to both parties, not just
one. 277 U.S. at p. 475. Holmes, on the other hand,
was shocked by the government's participation in this
"ignoble" or "dirty business". 277 U.S. at p. 470.9 Had the attempted application of the fourth
amendment to wiretapping been successful it would, of
course, have put evidence obtained by this means in
the same category as evidence physically seized incident
to an unreasonable search or seizure and therefore
inadmissible under the federal exclusionary rule an-
nounced in the Weeks case. After the Olmstead case,
however, the fourth amendment was discarded as a
vehicle of exclusion.10 Even if there were a statute prohibiting wiretap-
ping, such evidence still would have been admissible
under the common law rule, in the absence of express
legislative exclusion or judicial exclusion undertaken to
implement the intent of a statute prohibiting the
practice.
11 H.R. REP. No. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
Act.n Its expressed legislative purpose was to
create a new governmental agency, the Federal
Communications Commission, to regulate and
bring order to a rapidly mushrooming communi-
cations industry. 3 The act contained no direct
reference to wiretapping. One section, §605, how-
ever, made reference to, and did prohibit the inter-
ception and divulgence of "any interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio." 4 The
purpose of this section ostensibly was to transfer
the terms of Section 27 of the Radio Act of 192715
to the authority of the Federal Communications
Commission for enforcement.j 6 The lower federal
court decisions involving the use of wiretap evi-
dence immediately subsequent to the enactment
of Section 605 followed this construction of the
section, and failed to find it pertinent to wire-
tapping. 7 In a 1937 decision of the United States
Supreme Court, Nardone v. United States, s how-
ever, the Court held that wiretapping and the
admission of wiretap evidence in a federal court
constituted a violation of Section 605. The Court
ruled that the "plain language" of the statute for-
bids any person from intercepting and divulging
the contents of any telephone message.19 The
12 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1934).
13H.R. RP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3. (1934).
1448 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1934):
"Unauthorized publication or use of communications.
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or trans-
mitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or
publish the contents, -substance, purport, effect or
meaning thereof... and no person not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents ... of such
intercepted communication to any person; and no
person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in
receiving any interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio and use the same or any information con-
tained therein for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto."
1" §27 Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1162 (1927), 47
U.S.C. §81 (1927): "No person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any message and divulge or
publish the contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted messages to any person."
16 S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
17 In Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687 (1st Cir.
1938); Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936); and United
States v. Genello, 10 F. Supp. 751 (M.D. Pa. 1935), the
courts failed to consider the applicability of the newly
passed §605. In Smith v. United States, 91 F.2d 556
(D.C. Cir. 1937), a prosecution for evasion of liquor tax,
the court did take up the question and summarily
rejected the applicability of §605 to wiretapping.
18 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
19 The majority literally construed the statute so
that the "plain words" of §605 forbid anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone
1958]
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Court's literal construction of the statutory lan-
guage included wiretapping by federal agents
within its prohibitive scope as well as the presen-
tation of evidence gained in this manner.20 The
decision, while not overruling the Court's previous
refusal to outlaw wiretapping on constitutional
grounds,2' reached the same result by statutory
interpretation.22
Initially, by the Nardone decision, only direct
wiretap evidence was made inadmissible. The ex-
clusion of derivative wiretap evidence (evidence
obtained as a result of information gained from a
tap)2' and of evidence obtained from tapping an
intrastate communication soon followed.2 4 The
procedure for determining a claim of wiretapping
also was soon prescribed.2 -
Some hint of a need for an exception to or a
modification of this policy, however, became
visible.26 This need appears to have resulted in two
message and direct in equally clear language that "no
person" shall divulge or publish the message or its
contents to any person.2
0 This was a principal ground upon which the govern-
ment chose to base its contentions, reasoning that the
government was exempt from the definition of "no
person", while putting less emphasis upon the basic
issue of the applicability of §605 to wiretapping gen-
erally. If successful, this contention would have given
the government access to wiretapping while denying it
to all others. However, this distinction failed, the court
holding that "no person" under the statute compre-
hends federal agents and that the ban on communica-
tion to "any person" bars testimony as to the contents
of any intercepted message. Nardone v. United States,
supra note 18.
21 The court's refusal to find wiretapping a violation
of the fourth amendment in the Olnstead case, was not
disturbed.
2This result clearly represents the eventual triumph
of the attitude of revulsion toward the practice of
wiretapping expressed by Holmes and Brandeis in
their respective dissenting opinions in the Olmslead
decision.
23 After the reversal of the convictions in the first
Nardone case, the government re-arrested the de-
fendants and brought them to trial on the strength of
the derivative wiretap evidence. The Court responded
to this attempt by completely rejecting any definition
of "interception" which did not include the derivative
use of wiretapping. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 340 (1939).
24 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
25 This procedure provides for the pre-trial deter-
mination of: (1) whether the accused can establish that
wiretapping was, in fact, employed; and (2) if so,
whether the government's case is substantially derived
from that source. Nardone v. United States, supra
note 23 at p. 341.
26 The high point in the policy of total exclusion
appears to have been reached prior to World War II, in
Weiss v. United States, supra note 24. The effect of the
wartime need for effective counter-espionage is purely
speculative. However, there was considerable pressure
simultaneous decisions. The first case ruled that
the protection afforded by Section 605 was a
personal one, limited to the actual participants in
the intercepted conversation. - The approach
adopted in the second case involved a limitation
upon the applicability of Section 605 itself through
a narrowed interpretation of what constitutes an
interception under the statute.2'
to loosen up wiretap policy from both the executive and
legislative branches of the government, as well as from
administrative agencies. Whatever significance it may
have, the first modification in the Court's position came
shortly after Pearl Harbor.
The existence of executive pressure even before then
is indicated by a latter written by President Roosevelt
on Feb. 25, 1941, to J. Edgar Hoover. It is quoted in
part by Mr. Hoover in a letter published in 58 YALE
L.J. 401, 422 (1949). The letter strongly indicates the
President's approval of wiretapping in the investigation
of espionage and sabotage.
For reference to legislative pressure embodied in
some 30 proposals to legalize wiretapping in at least
some limited manner, see Comment, 52 Mrcfr. L.
REV. 430 (1954).
Mr. Roosevelt's letter seems to have been prompted
by Mr. Hoover's testimony before a Congressional
Committee on Feb. 17, 1941, at which time Mr.
Hoover defended the use of wiretapping in certain
fields, such as espionage, kidnapping and extortion.
58 YALE L.J. 401 at 423-424.
27 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). In
this case one convicted as a result of testimony elicited
by the use of a tapped conversation to which he was
not a party was not heard to claim the protection of
§605.
2' Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Inasmuch as this case involved a potentially greater
limitation on the scope of §605 it is a far more significant
qualification than that set forth in the Goldstein case.
The case involved the seizure of a communication
before it entered the telephone receiver via the use of a
detectaphone pressed against the wall of an adjoining
room by federal agents, thereby raising the issue of
what constitutes an "interception" under the statute.
The Court met the issue by finding "interception" to be
the seizure of a message while within the means of
communication, after sending and prior to receipt. The
narrowness of this definition strongly inferred a con-
siderable departure from the broad policies motivating
the Nardone decisions.
This interpretation impliedly condones another type
of interception applied with limited exception by the
circuit courts, that of consent by one of the parties to a
transcription made at one end of the communication.
Another refusal to apply §605 via this route came
ten years later in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952), in which the court refused to exclude a tran-
scription made via the use of a radio transmitter hidden
on the person of a federal informer, who engaged the
defendant in conversation within the defendant's place
of business. The evidence was admitted on the narrow
grounds that there was no trespass, and therefore, no
unreasonable search or seizure. The dissent by Justice
Douglas indicated that mere "lipservice" is being paid
the concept that wiretapping is "dirty business." This
dissent appears to illustrate that the attitude of the
Court had moved considerably from that expressed in
the Nardone decisions.
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The personal privilege doctrine meant simply
that persons who were not actual participants in
the telephone communication that was being
tapped were precluded from claiming the protec-
tion of Section 605.
The second approach limited the applicability
of Section 605 by restricting the concept of an
"interception" under the statute to a wiretap
interposed between the point of transmission and
receipt.n This meant, in effect, that a recording
made at either end of a .telephone communication
was not within the scope of the act. Prior to this
interpretation, any recording, regardless of where
made, was considered within the statute. This
limitation upon the exclusion of wiretap evidence
under Section 605 already had been applied," with
some exception, in the lower federal courts.
1 This construction did not originate with the
Supreme Court pronouncement in the Goldman case. In
fact, it is derived from a much earlier federal court
ruling in United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69
(W.D. Pa. 1939). The court there admitted a recording
of a telephone conversation made at one end of the
line with one party's consent, upon a finding that this
practice did not amount to an "interception" under
§605: "The manner in which the conversation in
question was recorded does not seem to present such an
interception as is contemplated by the quoted statute.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines the
verb 'intercept' in part as follows: 'To take or seize by
the way, or before arrival at the destined place:' The
call to the defendant was made by Agent White, and the
conversation between his interpretor and the defendant
was not obtained by a 'tapping of the wires' between the
locality of the call and the locality of answer by an
unauthorized person, but was, in effect, a mere record-
ing of the conversation at one end of the line by one of
the participants." This definition was approved by the
Supreme Court in the Goldman case.
This narrow interpretation of the term is expressed
by the dissent in Polakoff v. United States, 112 F.2d
888 (2nd Cir. 1940), which states that "interception
under the statute doesn't refer to a communication
which has reached its intended destination and is
recorded there."
30 United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.C.
1950), is the first case to follow the Yee Ping Jong de-
cision insofar as consent by one party was held to
remove a tap from the scope of an "interception" under
§605. Also following this approach are the later cases of
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (1953);
Flanders v. United States, 222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955);
Douglas v. United States, 250 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1957);
and Rathbun v. United States, 236 F.2d 514 (10th
Cir. 1956), affirmed 355 U.S. 107 (1957). In the latter
two cases officers listened in on an extension phone with
the consent of the party receiving the call. The distinc-
tion between listening in on an extension phone and at
the only outlet does not appear to be a very great one.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
lower court decision in the Rathbun case, appears to
lend at least tacit sanction to the effect which the lower
court gave to one party's consent, insofar as the ap-
plicability of §605 is concerned.
This, of course, is in addition to the Supreme Court's
The latest court decision on the general subject
of wiretapping, Benanti v. United Statesn arose
when the New York police, during a narcotics in-
vestigation, tapped a telephone which was known
to be used by the defendant. The interception was
instituted under a New York statute which pro-
vided for the granting of a warrant to install a
tap, upon the ex parte testimony of a police officer
above the rank of sergeant.n The tap resulted in
information which led to the arrest of the de-
fendant with quantities of illegal whiskey in his
possession. This constituted a federal offense and
the case was accordingly turned over to federal
authorities for prosecution in a federal district
court. The federal authorities made use of the evi-
dence obtained from the wiretap by the New York
police and secured a conviction.4 On appeal, the
court of appeals was confronted with the problem
of the admissibility in a federal court of wiretap
earlier endorsement, in Goldman v. United States, of the
definition of 'interception' advanced in the Yee Ping
Jong case.
1Opposed to the interpretation excluding transcrip-
tions made with one party's consent from the scope of
"interception under the statute were the Second Circuit
decisions in Polakoff v. United States, supra note 29;
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2nd Cir.
1947), and United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957). The spirit of these decisions remained
steadfast to that of Nardone in giving the broadest
possible scope to the statute so as to afford personal
privacy maximum protection, even at the expense of
society's competing interest in the apprehension of
criminals.
The former two decisions, however, were both by a
closely divided court; and there has been considerable
feeling that the majority's broad interpretation of
"interception" could no longer stand in the light of the
-Supreme Court's definition of interception in the
Goldman case. As indicated, this limits the protection of
§605 to messages still within the means of communica-
tion itself. This feeling is expressed in United States v.
Sullivan, supra note 30, which expresses certain doubt,
in view of the Goldman case, as to the continued vitality
of the Polakoff approach. James v. United States, 191 F.
2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951), appears to follow the Polakoff
rule, impairing the authority of the Lewis case on the
subject in the District of Columbia circuit. However,
the district court in United States v. Sullivan declined to
follow the James case on the grounds that the upper
court definition of "interception" to include transcripts
made with one party's consent was obiter dictum, and
was based on the Polakoff case, the authority of which
was considered to be impaired: "On principle as well
as in the light of the state of authorities.., the con-
clusion seems inescapable that the Act of Congress does
not apply to listening to a telephone conversation with
the consent of one of the parties to it."
2 244 F.2d 389 (2nd Cir. 1957), 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
"NEw Yosx CONST. art. 1 §12; N. Y. CODE Or
CRm-AL PnocxiRu §813-a.
31 This situation is distinguished from that of the
Nardone cases, in which federal agents themselves en-
gaged in the wiretapping.
1958]
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evidence obtained by state officers incident to the
enforcement of state law and in accordance with
state procedure, but which was subsequently
turned over to federal prosecutors. The court of
appeals, in a departure from a former position of
total exclusion,"5 upheld the lower court admission
of the wiretap evidence upon which the conviction
rested,36 holding that Section 605 was no longer
applicable to the problem.Y The court instead
applied the principles governing the admissibility
of evidence under the federal exclusionary rule, ;
and held the evidence admissible under the excep-
tion to the rule which permits the use of evidence
not seized by, or in conjunction with, federal
agents,9 or in the enforcement of federal law.40 The
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and
reversed the court of appeals, holding the wiretap
evidence inadmissible. 4' The Court's ruling ap-
pears to have rested primarily upon the gounds
that: (1) Section 605 creates a federal right of free-
dom from the admission in a federal court of evi-
dence procured by wiretapping; and (2) this right
may not be indirectly contravened by the use of
a state statute. The lower court's position that
Section 605 may no longer be considered applicable
was wholly rejected.
At first glance the Benanti decision apparently
indicates that the Court repented any of its devia-
35 As pointed out above, see note 31 supra, the Second
Circuit, under Learned Hand, had hitherto strictly con-
formed to the spirit of the Nardone decisions.
36 There is little doubt that derivative wiretap evi-
dence formed almost the entirety of the government's
case, the arrest of the defendant resulting from informa-
tion obtained from the tap.
7 In this departure from the attitude of the Nardone
cases, the court ruled that its prior policy of totally
excluding wiretap evidence under §605 is no longer
tenable in light of subsequent Supreme Court affirma-
tion of both state and federal convictions based on
wiretapping.
3 Thus it appears that the court returned to the
principles which were rejected in the Olnstead case,
the application of the criteria used to determine ad-
missibility of unlawfully seized evidence. In doing so,
the court supports its position by citing the parallel
drawn in the Goldstein case, between the policy of
preventing violation of the fourth amendment and the
Federal Communications Act.
This amounts to a statement in Goldstein v. United
States, supra note 27, at p. 120, that although wire-
tapping, "does not amount to a search and seizure
prohibited by the fourth amendment... we have ap-
plied the same policy in respect of the prohibition of
the Federal Communications Act."
1 United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389, 392
(2nd Cir. 1957).
40 244 F.2d at 393. See also: In re Milburne, 77 F.
2d 310 (2nd Cir. 1935) and Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927).
4' Benanti v. United States, 355 U. S. 96 (1957).
tions from the Nardone spirit of total exclusion.
If so, the result has been effected by resort to the
conveniently available Section 605. The Court, as
in the Nardone cases, declared itself bound by a
"dear mandate" from Congress prohibiting the
use of wiretap evidence.42 It therefore found the
use made of wiretap evidence in the Benanti case
to be no different than the derivative use forbidden
by Nardone. The broad policy of translating
"into practicality the broad considerations of mo-
rality and public well-being,"" which motivated
the Court's former decisions, was reiterated, only
this time in terms of enhancing "the proper ad-
ministration of criminal justice.""
Part of the Benanti case involved a novel ques-
tion in the law relative to wiretapping-whether
the Section 605 prohibition of the use of wire-
tapping in a federal court may be avoided where
the evidence is properly obtained under state law
incident to the enforcement of state law, and only
subsequently turned over to federal authorities
where a federal offense happens to have been in-
volved. The Court held that the states have been
pre-empted in this field by Section 605, at least
insofar as admission into evidence in a federal
court is concerned.45 In so doing, it declared that
the "comprehensive scheme of interstate regula-
tion and public policy underlying §605," precludes
the possibility of a state legislature avoiding the




The validity of the Court's position would be
unassailable if the intent of Congress were, in fact,
that attributed to it by the Court. The question
is, however, did Congress intend also to include a
42The express return to both the broad scope and
applicability given §605 in the Nardone decisions, is
apparent in the following language: "Confronted as
we are by this clear statute and resting our decision
upon its provisions, it is neither necessary nor appro-
priate to discuss by analogy distinctions suggested to
be applicable to the Fourth Amendment. Section 605
contains an express, absolute prohibition against the
divulgence of wiretapping. Nardone v. U. S., 302 U.S.
379, 382. This case is but another example of the use of
wiretapping that was so clearly condemned under the
circumstances in the Second Nardone decision." 355
U. S. at 158-159.
43 Nardone v. United States, supra note 23.
44 Benanti v. United States, supra note 41.
45 Whether this extends to admissibility in a state
court is by no means clear. On its face, at least, the
decision doesn't appear to create a federal right to
freedom from the admission of wiretap evidence in a
state court. If it did, state court admission of such evi-
dence would be subject to attack under the fourteenth
amendment.
46 Benanti v. United States, supra note 41.
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far reaching rule of criminal investigation and evi-
dence when it passed the act purportedly aimed
at the establishment of a unified agency to regulate
the communications industry?4 Was Congress
motivated by those "broad considerations of
morality and public well-being," 4s which the
Court ascribed to it? In short, is wiretapping part
of the "comprehensive scheme of interstate regu-
lation and the public policy underlying §605?"0
The evidence is to the contrary. It seems clear
that both the "broad considerations of morality
and public policy," and the purpose of enhancing
the "proper administration of criminal justice,"
emanate not from the intent of Congress, but from
the attitude of the Supreme Court itself toward
wiretapping.
The weakness of the Supreme Court's position
is demonstrated in the Nardone case, where it
recognized that attempts to specifically reach
wiretapping after the Olmstead decision had failed
in Congress." It also recognized that the express
purpose of the act involved the creation of the
Federal Communications Commission and the
transfer of authority over wire and radio commu-
nication to that agency.5 The basic weakness in
the Court's position appears to stem from an un-
willingness to move on to the motivation behind
the creation of the Federal Communications Com-
mission. These purposes embody the fundamental
objectives behind the enabling legislation itself,
such as the insurance of reasonable and non-
discriminatory rates, the control of mergers within
the industry, and the regulation and limitation of
the growth and power of holding company con-
trol.52
The scope of the Federal Communications
Commission included the consolidation of the
existing powers of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Radio Board, and the Postmaster
General in order to effectively implement these
objectives.0 Prior to this consolidation, the rather
7 H.R. REP No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3. (1934).
43 Nardone v. United States, supra note 23.
4 Benanti v. United States, supra note 41.
60 Nardone v. United States, supra note 18, at p. 381.
51 Id. at 382.
52 H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
51 In the Senate discussions of the bill, Senator Dill,
the bill's proponent, speaks of the hitherto inadequate
regulation of telephone and telegraph companies and
reiterates the purport of the committee report's stated
purpose of transferring existing authority of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, Postmaster General,
and Radio Commission in the area, to the unified au-
thority of the Federal Communications Commission
in order to more effectively accomplish this purpose.
complex administrative system and divided regu-
latory power in the field hindered their successful
attainment.
The error of the Court lay in its failure to recog-
nize that the legislation was merely an expedient
alteration of the administrative structure to better
accomplish existing purposes,-4 i.e. the regulation
and control of the communications companies
through the medium of a unified federal agency.-5
Whatever additions were made to existing law
were merely designed to facilitate "effective regu-
lation" by the newly created communications
commission.'
5
Further evidence that the prohibition of wire-
tapping is beyond the scope of Section 605 may
be gleaned from the House Committee Report.
The report stated that the bill does not "very
greatly change or add to 'existing law," and Lhat
"most controversial questions are held in abey-
ance, for a report by the new commission recom-
mending legislation for their solution."'' If wire-
tapping is to be considered a "controversial
question," it is apparent that Congress expressly
deferred legislation on the subject, pending a
report from the new commission. In the light of
the Court's recognition of the unsuccessful at-
tempts to legislate on the subject of wiretapping
and the close division of the Court in the Olmstead
case, it appears very difficult to classify wire-
tapping as anything other than "controversial."
Furthermore, the bill refers to and provides the
procedure intended by the legislature to be used
in dealing with the problem-that procedure being
investigation and recommendation by the com-
mission. At any rate, it does not appear to involve
" This dissatisfaction with the existent administra-
tive structure was expressed in a letter written by
President Roosevelt to the Senate on Feb. 26, 1934.
This letter called for the unified administrative au-
thority embodied in the bill. It is printed in H.R. REP.
No. 1850, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
" Viewed from this point of view the Act is the com-
munications counterpart of the Interstate Commerce
Commission's regulation and control in the area of
common carriers by rail. The power of investigation,
suspension of rates and schedules, limited use of funds
in capital accounty by corporate officers, forfeitures
for rebates and offset, and to require filing of contracts
between communication companies indicate similarity.
The procedures provided by the Act are also similar to
those of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
56 H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
17 Id. "The bill is largely based upon existing legis-
lation and except for the change in administrative
authority does not very greatly change or add to exist-
ing law; most controversial questions are held in abey-
ance for a report by the new commission recommending
legislation for their solution."
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any intention to deal currently with the wiretap
problem in the Federal Communications Act.-s
In view of these considerations it may be ob-
served that the Court's "clear mandate" against
wiretapping motivated by "broad considerations
of morality and public well-being," is a creation
purely its own. Certainly it finds no basis in the
legislative history of the Federal Communications
Act.
The impact of the Benanti decision may be inter-
preted in two different ways. The first possibility
is the more restricted one. It simply involves view-
ing the decision as a refusal by the Court to sanc-
tion the new and broad exception the lower courts
were trying to make to the rule of general exclu-
sion announced in the Nardone decisions. This was
perhaps reinforced by the fear that an acceptance
of the lower court substitution of the principles of
the federal exclusionary rule for Section 605 might
possibly undermine the future effectiveness of
that section as an anti-wiretapping weapon in the
hands of the Court. Consequently, the Court's
rejection of the evidence may be viewed in terms
of a statutory interpretation and reaffirmation by
the Court of the fundamental applicability of
Section 605, more than a reversion to the Nardone
policy of complete exclusion.59
63 Pertinent to the subject of the intent of Congress
is the only statement relating to the miscellaneous sec-
tion of the Act, Title VI, containing §605. This ex-
planation was given by the bill's sponsor, Senator Dill,
and contained no reference whatever to the highly
controversial subject of wiretapping, much less a
"clear mandate" of prohibition in the field. In fact,
no mention whatever is made of §605, itself. 78 CONG.
Rac. 8822 (1934).
It would be curious indeed if the Congress intended
to enact a broad prohibition in this controversial area
without mentioning the practice prohibited in the bill
itself or alluding in debate to the section purportedly
containing the "clear mandate" of prohibition. All this
while the committee report expressly disclaims new
legislation on "controversial questions." Therefore, it
would appear reasonable to conclude that if the Federal
Communications Act and §605 contain such a "clear
mandate" against wiretapping it does not emanate
from the legislative branch. More reasonably it ema-
nated from the spirit of the dissents expressed by Justice
Holmes and Brandeis in the Olmstead case.
The committee report, H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1934), in analysing the section pur-
ported to ban wiretapping states only that:
"§605... prohibiting unauthorized publication of
communications, is based on §27 of the Radio Act, but
is also made to apply to wire communications."
This cursory treatment of the section also appears
to belie any interpretation of the section which would
create an intention on the part of Congress to reach the
practice of wiretapping with this particular bill.
In light of these considerations the use of the word
"intercept" would more readily be explained in terms
The second approach is precipitated by the
latter part of the Benanti opinion, which may be
interpreted as making Section 605 pre-emptive of
state legislation in the field of wiretapping, by
holding in effect that state legislation may not
deny an individual the protection of the federal
right afforded by Section 605. The problem thus
raised relates to the definition of this federal right
created by the section. Is the right the more re-
stricted one of freedom from the introduction of
wiretap evidence in federal court only, or does it
extend to the admission of all wiretap evidence
obtained in violation of the Court's construction
of Section 605? If the former is the case the deci-
sion goes no further than the rejection of the ex-
ception put forth by the lower court.10 However,
if the scope of the right created by the Court in-
cludes freedom from the admission of all such evi-
dence whatsoever, the future use of wiretap
evidence in state courts will be vulnerable to
an attack under the fourteenth amendment.6'
Viewing the decision from this standpoint, it
might bring on a fresh onslaught against the use
of wiretap evidence in the state courts. 2
of incautious draftsmanship in carrying it forward from
its use in reference to radio messages than in terms of a
"clear mandate" from Congress against wiretapping,
or underlying Congressional considerations of "morality
and public well-being."
59 This is supported to some extent by the Court's
affirmation, on the same day as the Benanti decision,
of a conviction resting upon a conversation overheard
on an extention phone in Rathbun v. United States,
supra note 30.
Certainly the deviations from the original policy
of complete exclusion discussed above still stand, as
does the inapplicability of the fourth amendment to
wiretapping:
Goldstein v. United States, supra note 27, restriction
of the scope of the act to actual participants in the
"intercepted" conversation; Goldman v. United States,
supra note 28, narrowed definition of "interception"
under the Act; Schwartz v. State, 344 U. S. 199 (1952),
inapplicability of §605 exclusion of wiretap evidence to
state courts; and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438 (1928), inapplicability of the fourth amendment to
wiretapping.
6DThe basis upon which certiorari was granted, the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the lower
federal courts, supports this view.
61 This matter was apparently settled by Schwartz
v. State, supra note 59 in which a Texas conviction
resting on wiretap evidence was affirmed, the §605 rule
of exclusion being held inapplicable to state court ad-
mission of wiretap evidence.
6However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Commonwealth v. Voci, 143 A.2d 652 (1958), cert. de-
nied, 27 U.S.L. 'WEEK 3148 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1958), has
reaffirmed its policy of admitting wiretap evidence.
The court pointed out that Benanti did not over-rule
Schwartz.
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Clearly, the existing situation indicates that a
direct mandate by Congress in- this area is long
past due. In this regard it is.essential that Congress
give due weight to the great sfake which society
has in effective law enforcement as opposed to the
conflicting right to absolute-privacy in the use ot
the telephone. It is indeed questionable whether
any such right whatever exists in one utilizing the
communications netvork- to push narcotics to
betray his country, or to further any manner of
unlawful activity. It is submitted that no such
right exists and that one using the communication
media, in such manner forfeits all right to privacy
in that use. The folly ot creating a non-existent or
purely academic right of privacy at the cost of
impairing the effective enforcement of the law and
the protection of'society is one which should not
be tolerated. The current creation of such a right
by the Court through its interpretation of Section
605; appears to exact such a price, serving only
to shield the criminal element. and thwart the
proper .adm~inistratn-of justice.,,.
1958]
